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Abstract: 
This paper looks at the variegated impact of the 2008 global financial crisis 
and the different ways in which local strategic actors imagined and 
responded to it through a comparative study of Barcelona, Brussels, Leeds 
and Turin. Drawing on Cultural Political Economy, we see crisis moments as 
fertile territory for the analysis of variegation in urban neoliberalisation 
processes as they can break path-dependencies and open up alternatives. 
Inspired by the comparative turn in critical urban studies, our case studies 
are not offered as representative samples but as dense sites to explore the 
various interpretations and uses of the crisis, particularly at the elite level. 
This analysis suggests considerable variegation in how the crisis was both 
felt and interpreted locally across the four cities. The local elites did not 
regard this as a crisis of or in their own urban growth models but as 
something external. However, as the global financial crisis morphed into 
national sovereign debt crises and austerity programmes, the experience in 
each city has been relatively similar. The paper concludes by emphasising 
the continuity function of specific local actors through the processes of 
meaning-making they engage in, something that existing work on variegated 
neoliberalisation has so far overlooked.  
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Introduction: Cities and the global financial crisis 
This paper is the result of a collaborative project to locate the global 
financial-economic crisis of 2008 and onwards in four European cities. We 
conduct a comparative case study analysis of Barcelona, Brussels, Leeds 
and Turin, highlighting the variegated urbanisation of the crisis and the 
different ways in which strategic actors imagined and responded to the 
crisis. We are interested in the context-specific trajectories of the global 
crisis seen from the lens of the city, particularly in the ways in which the 
discursive construction of the global crisis in each urban context reflects the 
specific configuration of urban political economies across Europe. The paper 
takes the global financial crisis as a strategic moment for the study of how 
urban neoliberalisation processes are taking shape in cities, if they have 
significantly been disrupted, challenged, contested, deepened or sharpened. 
Thus the research is situated within the wider field of the study of 
variegated neoliberalisation. 
Almost a decade after the early signs of the global financial crisis in 2007/8 
we know a fair amount about how it unravelled at an international and 
global scale particularly in USA and Europe (See for example Blyth, 2013; 
Duménil and Lévy, 2011; Jessop, 2015; Schäfer and Streeck, 2013). There 
has also been specific research on the urban scale of the crisis. In terms of 
its origins, research has shown the importance of urban accumulation 
processes (Harvey, 2012) such as the financialisation of urban development 
and mortgage markets (Aalbers, 2012) in actually generating the global 
financial crisis. In terms of the impacts of the crisis and subsequent 
austerity measures, we find both case-study research and European-wide 
analysis. The findings are quite conclusive and reverberate at various scales. 
At a European wide level, Parkinson (2012) shows that the gap (measured in 
GDP terms) between European city capitals and second tier cities that had 
been closing in the boom times is now widening and could get even wider if 
in austerity times policy makers privilege large capital cities. Within cities, 
the European Commission is also worried about the increased spatial 
segregation and social polarisation in European cities after the crisis (EU 
Commission 2011). Overall, therefore, the conclusion is that there has been 
“disproportionate impact of austerity measures in poor and most vulnerable 
in our cities” (Donald et al, 2014: 4). In the realm of urban governance the 
impact of austerity measures has been devastating for municipal budgets 
which have suffered huge losses (Donald et al, 2014; Meegan et al, 2014) 
impacting on the reduction of services and welfare for the poorest.  
Responses to the crisis at the urban level have not established a rupture 
with previous phase (Oosterlynck and Gonzalez, 2013). Even in a 
differentiated fashion, we find that local authorities are still relying and 
3 
 
actively promoting the integration of finance and real estate in cities such as 
Dublin or Leeds (Byrne, 2016; Gonzalez & Oosterlynck, 2014). In Malmo the 
city is trying to build itself out of the crisis with more hotels and shopping 
centres (Holgersen, 2015); in Paris risky investment in infrastructure mega-
projects is carrying on (Enright, 2014). Smart-city strategies have been 
widely adopted in response to the crisis, but at the same time – as the case-
studies of Barcelona and Turin analysed here will underline – they have 
been pursued relying on pre-existing pro-growth coalitions and economic 
development patterns (March and Ribera-Fumaz 2016; Rossi, 2016). Donald 
et al (2014: 4) interpret this trend as a further re-scaling of the state with 
the creation of new “austerity regimes” which often “operate outside the 
formal mechanism of government”.  
Therefore we have learnt quite a lot about the causes, impacts and effects of 
the global financial crisis at the urban level. However we find two significant 
gaps: Previous research has either focused on single case studies or on a 
bird’s eye view of cities at a European or global scale but there been little 
analysis to compare the significance of the crisis across various cities. 
Relatedly, there has not been yet a serious attempt to take this crisis 
moment as an analytical entry point to further our understanding on the 
ways in which variegation develops and takes shape at the urban scale, 
something which has an effect on wider structural processes. Building on 
these gaps our paper makes various contributions. Firstly, we focus on the 
inner geographical workings of the global financial-economic crisis as it is 
experienced by key local decisions makers to study how variegation of 
governmental rationalities occurs at the scale of urban political economies. 
Crucially, we situate this analysis within the structural position of cities in 
national territories, inter-urban networks and global political-economic 
structures. Secondly, through a comparative approach, we overcome the 
limits of one case study approaches that have been dominating the 
literature so far. These contributions are situated within critical scholarship 
about how governmental rationalities develop variegated geographical forms.  
The paper is structured as follows: In the next section, we draw from various 
theoretical and methodological debates to propose our own approach which 
combines cultural political economy with a comparative perspective. Next, 
we present our case study cities and how the global financial crisis was 
narrated and located there. Then we develop a cross-national qualitative 
analysis across the four cities paying attention at how or if variegation takes 
place posing wider questions about the variegation of urban 
neoliberalisation and how if so this has been affected by the global financial 
crisis.  
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Enriching variegation studies through comparative cultural political 
economy 
Over the past decades, neoliberalism has become a powerful explanatory 
process to understand a wide range of transformations in societies. Not 
surprisingly, due to its conceptual laxity there has been a lively debate on 
its definition and geo-political contours and even an emerging backlash 
against the concept’s usefulness (Springer, 2012). A useful approach is that 
taken by Brenner, Peck and Theodore who have stressed how 
neoliberalisation has never been a uniform, evenly spread blanket of set 
ideas that covers all countries and power institutions. Instead, rather than 
assuming neoliberalism’s presence in a country, region or city, it should be 
analysed as the “systemic production of geoinstitutional differentiation” 
around processes of market-oriented restructuring of political economies 
(Brenner et al. 2010: 184). Cities in their analysis play a prominent role, as 
scales of experimentation and variegation of neoliberalism.  
With the advent of the global financial crisis in 2007-08, the discussion has 
moved to the analysis of how, or if, this variegated neoliberalisation process 
has been questioned, has faltered or has been even transcended. Springer 
(2015) dismisses the early proclamations of “end of neoliberalism” discourse 
and argues that as neoliberalism is best understood as a polymorphic, 
incomplete, variegated and contradictory unfolding process, it is therefore 
not expected to collapse as a  single entity (see also Peck et al 2010). 
Instead, we are witnessing a series of sometimes disconnected but yet 
related series of  counter and anti-neoliberalisation arguments and 
resistance, particularly by city-based social movements in the United States 
and Southern Europe, which were most hit by the 2007-8 crisis (Mayer, 
2013) 
Against the backdrop of this contradictory scenario characterizing post-
recession capitalist societies, our analytical focus is on the manifold ways in 
which processes of neoliberalism are deepened and contested, re-oriented 
and transformed in particular localities through the moment of crisis. Crisis 
moments can be a particular fertile territory for the analysis of variegation 
as they potentially break path dependencies and open up alternatives. Here 
we are inspired by the Cultural Political Economy approach developed by 
Jessop and Sum (2013) (see also Gonzalez, 2006; Jessop and Oosterlynck, 
2008; Ribera-Fumaz, 2009).  Crucially, this perspective requires us to study 
capitalism, not as a top down, coherent and unidirectional smooth force, but 
as an ontologically complex social relation (Rossi, 2013), which develops a 
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socio-spatially variegated territoriality, actualized in particular contexts by 
local actors involved in urban governance and local economic development. 
Indeed, the institutionalisation of particular forms of capital accumulation is 
“an improbable feat” and as Jessop reminds us “agency matters – and is 
often conflictual” (Jessop, 2014: 50). To cope with this complexity, actors 
build imaginaries that help them make sense of their concrete realities 
(Jessop and Oosterlynck, 2008) and it is these imaginaries that can be put 
in question in times of crisis. Jessop in particular has analysed the “north 
Atlantic financial crisis” studying how actors at the national and 
international scales, make sense of the different and contested meanings of 
the crisis and how this sense-making shapes responses to it (Jessop, 2015). 
He analyses the evolutionary process of the crisis construal process paying 
attention to the co-constitutive semiotic and material elements that actors 
have to deal with at various spatial scales.   
Inspired by Jessop’s work, we are interested in analysing how local 
actors identify the origins of the crisis, its spatio-temporal delimitations and 
if they regard it as a crisis in or of their local economic development and 
governance models. In particular, our study pays more attention to the 
semiotic elements of the crisis construal process and as such our research 
focus is on the urban governance rationalities. By governance rationalities, 
we understand the institutionalised ways in which the local elites coordinate 
their work and make sense of their context which in turn shapes to an 
extent the local accumulation strategies. Different and sometimes competing 
narratives of the crisis have to be negotiated by urban governance actors. 
This complex process in turn needs to be contextualised within national 
path dependencies and global economic and policy trends. By looking at the 
local interpretations of the global crisis we are able to capture and slice 
through the multi-scalarity of this process.  This vantage point gives us 
access to analyse if and how the crisis triggers different reactions across 
different places thus establishing patterns and differences in how 
variegation takes place.   
 As introduced above we develop a comparative analysis of four European 
cities: Barcelona, Brussels, Leeds and Turin. The research was part of a 
network project that lasted from 2010 to 2014 in which the authors of this 
article collectively built a theoretical framework and methodology and 
supported each other with each case study fieldwork. Inspired by the recent 
comparative turn in English-language urban studies (McFarlane, 2010; 
Robinson, 2016; Ward, 2010), our research was not designed in a traditional 
fashion to look exactly at the same elements in each of the case studies but 
to adapt the research questions to what it would make sense in each of the 
cities (Ward, 2010). Thus, for example, we did not systematically compare 
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the impact of the crisis across the same economic sectors or compare the 
same type of policies in the four cities as these were not equally relevant for 
each of them. Overall, we did not aim to compare similar cities but in fact to 
learn from the difference in order to maximise our understanding of the 
process of variegation. A particularly useful technique that we used, when 
possible, was to do our fieldwork in pairs so that each of us worked for a 
short intense period of time in another city taking part in fieldwork. This 
helped to unhide issues that would be almost invisible to the “local” 
researcher such as the local governance culture, the relative importance or 
not of certain political actors and economic processes. Thus we developed a  
“relational comparison” as understood by Ward (2008), where by using “one 
site to pose questions of another” (Roy, 2003: 466 cited in Ward, 2008: 408) 
we avoided taking for granted the processes underpinning each of the cities’ 
trajectories and scalarity.  This collaborative approach also made us think 
about the connections between our case study cities and others and also 
with transnational bodies and networks (Reference deleted to preserve 
anonymity). The choice of the four case studies was largely guided by our 
place of work where we had most expertise and it was logistically easy to 
conduct fieldwork and not according to any pre-set categories. The case 
studies are not meant to be a representative sample of European cities but 
key and dense sites where to explore the various interpretations and 
impacts of the crisis. In that sense we can use Robinson’s (2014) ideas to 
retrospectively describe our method as “composing a bespoke comparison 
across a repeated instance” which in our case would be the global financial 
crisis.  
Our main methods were to interview key informants such as local authority 
representatives and officers, businessmen and women, union leaders, 
community leaders. Overall we interviewed around 50 across the four cities 
between 2011 and 2015. We also analysed key policy documents about the 
crisis or related to the particular local economic or political situation of each 
of the cities. As each of the authors lived in or near the case studies cities 
other forms of more informal data gathering also took place such as 
attending policy or academic conferences or events about or related to the 
crisis, following the local media and discussing with other academics.  
 
Narrating the crisis across urban Europe 
In this section we move on to our core of the empirical analysis in this 
paper, namely the diverse ways in which these four cities have narrated the 
crisis. To help the reader locate these cities we offer a table with some key 
indicators of the crisis in each city (See Table 1). We first sketch the broad 
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characteristics of each city and look at their pre-crisis growth strategies. 
Then we focus on how the dominant narratives of the crisis vary between 
these four cities and where the local economic and political elites locate the 
origins and the impacts of the crisis. We also analyse briefly any new 
emerging post-crisis initiatives.  
 
Leeds: the crisis is in here; a resilient economy will save us. 
Leeds is a regional city in the north of England. The strength of its 
predominantly private sector-led economy is moderately high, with its GDP 
below the EU-28 average (91) (Eurostat, 2016). Over the last decades the 
Leeds economy has grown particularly in the financial services sector, which 
accounts for 35% of the GVA of the city (Leeds City Council, 2016). In 
parallel, manufacturing has decreased substantially since the 1980s but not 
as dramatically as with other former industrial Northern English cities still 
maintaining a healthy advanced manufacturing sector. It has therefore a 
diversified economic base. At the same time it is also a segregated city, the 
most polarised of the Northern English (Schmuecker and Viitanen, 2011), 
with a concentration of deprivation in inner city neighbourhoods (Leeds City 
Council, 2015).  
The pre-crisis urban development model of Leeds was not solely based on 
the growth of the financial sector mentioned above, but also on a real estate 
boom centred on the building of thousands of city-centre apartments 
(Gonzalez and Hodkinson, 2014) with, according one prominent real estate 
agent we interviewed  a “vast marketing machine behind unviable schemes” 
and no real checks by the local authority  - it was “absolute hysteria”.   
In this urban growth context, the advent of the global financial-economic 
crisis in Leeds came abrupt. Its impact was felt immediately right after the 
collapse of the global finance giant Lehman Brothers as described to us by a 
key actor in the finance sector: “In Autumn 2008 here […] it was almost as if 
the economy went in panic mode […] what was happening is that [property 
and corporate] transactions, businesses, deals were stopping mid-track. All 
relied on finance, so they just stopped” (cited in XX and XX  Reference 
deleted to preserve anonymity). The US Lehman Brothers catastrophe was 
followed in less than a month by the crisis of the merged Halifax and Bank 
of Scotland (HBOS) and Lloyds banks that had to be bailed out by the UK 
government. Halifax Plc (part of HBOS) employed around 10,000 people in 
the wider Leeds City Region, whose jobs were now at risk because of 
planned consolidation of the banks’ offices. Swiftly, local and regional 
authorities formed a lobby asking the bank executives to keep the region as 
an important base for the banks (Yorkshire Forward, 2008: 3).  
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It is interesting to note how the crisis in Leeds was felt, by the economic and 
political elites, as a sudden external shock reverberating over a frenetic 
rhythm of global and national bad news landing on the city. However, 
looking in detail, there had been a series of premonitory events pointing at 
the limits of the local economic development strategies. The real estate boom 
of the early 2000s described above started to falter with a stream of projects 
in 2007 and early 2008 grinding to a halt or temporarily stalling.  
So even if several interviewees told us that the speculative property 
development and bank lending were unsustainable and unrealistic there 
was no common forum to discuss this and build a narrative. This lack of 
strategic thinking is generally attributed to Leeds as a city where the 
diversity of the economy, the significance of the private businesses and the 
often distant decision making spheres mean that there is neither a central 
economic sector nor a strong public sector voice. So for example a Professor 
in Employment and Regional Development in a local university said “It is not 
a Leeds style to get together and discuss crisis; because it’s always a 
resilient economy, no need to get together” and two employees of global 
consultancies remarked “In Leeds there is no macro-policy like in 
Manchester” or “a grand view of Leeds is only going to be the sum of 
individual positions of people on Leeds”.  
The early beginnings of the crisis in Leeds were momentous and visible 
because they resonated with global events and hit the financial sector which 
had been heavily promoted; therefore the crisis was very much “in here” In 
the first instance, the city braced itself for very significant job losses as 
predicted by a prestigious national think tank (Larkin and Cooper, 2009). 
The reality, however, is that the job losses were worse in the manufacturing 
sector; as the crisis progressed it was clear across the UK that it was the 
jobs at the lower end of the value chain in manufacturing, construction and 
retailing more prominent in some cities, which suffered the most (Lee et al, 
2009). The feeling was, as summed by the head of the Chamber of 
Commerce in our interview “It’s been the worst recession that we have even 
known. But it has been worse elsewhere”. So, after the initial shock, there 
was no attempt by the urban political-economic elites to reflect on the local 
economic development strategy; the crisis was understood as generating 
from elsewhere the Leeds elites stuck with the pre-crisis image of the 
financial city. The fact that the job losses turned out to be significantly 
below what was predicted helped to solidify this narration of the crisis. 
Therefore by 2009 and especially by 2010 and 2011 the economy of the city 
was already being re-imagined as in recovery and a powerful discourse of its 
resilient and diverse economy took hold among the local elites, national 
think tanks and economic commentators (Gonzalez and Oosterlynck, 2014). 
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This externalisation of the global financial was also common at the national 
UK level with policy makers and politicians arguing it was a contagion effect 
from the US mortgage and banking crisis (Hay, 2013) 
After this first blow, accompanied by a national recession in the economy 
between 2008 and 9, a new phase developed. In May 2010, a Conservative-
Liberal Democrat coalition government was formed with an austerity plan 
designed to substantially reform the welfare state which had direct and long 
reaching impact in British cities. In Leeds, the local public budget has been 
drastically reduced in a cumulative cut of £214m between 2010 and 2016 
(Halliday, 2016) to the point according to the authority itself “where it 
threatens our ability to support even the services we must provide by law” 
(LCC, 2013). In parallel, many people whose social assistance is being 
reduced are struggling “to live a fulfilled, healthy and poverty free life as a 
result of benefit changes” (Advice Leeds, 2013). Between 2010 and 2014 this 
translated into the closures of seven residential homes, 12 day centres, 14 
libraries, two leisure centres, two community centres, a one-stop centre, and 
three hostels (Metcalf, 2014) . Despite these very negative impacts for 
residents, the public narrative is that of a city that has bounced back after 
the crisis with a resilient economy and a quiet resentment about the 
national austerity programme.  
The public sector cuts have led to a reconceptualization of what a local 
government is and can do with Leeds positioning itself as a “civic 
entrepreneur”. In an interview, this was defined by the chief executive of 
Leeds City Council as: “we have to […] make local government more 
business-like more commercial because that is what we have to do with the 
cuts, to become more efficient, more focused”. Examples of this civic 
entrepreneurialism have been hosting sporting events in the city, facilitating 
private retail developments, delivering a new events arena and supporting 
social enterprises as well as building more homes (Gonzalez and 
Oosterlynck, 2014)  
The narration of the crisis in Leeds evolved considerably with time and 
changed in spatial focus. While the initial impact was focused on the 
bursting of the real estate boom and the financial institution both located in 
the city centre, the ‘socialisation’ of the crisis with austerity moved to the 
deprived neighbourhoods and became less visible in the public discourse. 
The city is represented as having weathered the crisis because of its diverse 
and resilient economy with little rethinking of its economic growth 
pathways. As other cities in the UK (Fuller and West, 2016) the austerity 
discourse has gripped the logics of the local authority displacing critiques 
and contestation. 
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TABLE 1 AROUND HERE 
 
Barcelona: ‘Against the crisis, more Barcelona’ 
Barcelona is the second biggest city in Spain with a population of 1,6m 
(3,2m within the metropolitan area). It is classified as one of the most global 
cities in the world by the GaWc (2012). Its economy has been increasingly 
turning on to tourism, with 8,3 million tourists staying in hotels in the city 
in 2015 (46,8% more than in 2005; BCC, 2016), logistics and business 
services (serving a metropolitan region specialised in the car, 
pharmaceutical and agro-food industry).  
The city is recognised internationally for having hosted the Olympic Games 
in 1992 and using them to regenerate large parts of the city – something 
widely known as the “Barcelona model”. By 2000s the ‘Barcelona model’, 
heavily based on the production of public space and place promotion, 
shifted towards attracting knowledge-intensive businesses to make 
Barcelona competitive in these industries and smart technologies (March 
and Ribera-Fumaz, 2016). 
In this scenario, in Barcelona the crisis was narrated as ‘out there’. The 
political and economic elites in Barcelona interpreted the global financial-
economic crisis as the failure of the Spanish construction-led growth 
strategy which had predominated in the early 2000s. Indeed, the collapse of 
the Spanish economy and its model of growth in 20089 was alongside 
Greece and Ireland the biggest one in Europe. The local elites located this 
crisis at the national scale, differentiating it from the “Barcelona model”. The 
interpretation of the crisis in Barcelona has therefore been pre-dominantly 
driven by an exogenous logic. This argument is encapsulated in the title of 
the 2009 annual public conference by the Mayor: ‘against the crisis, more 
Barcelona’ (Hereu, 2009). This slogan signals two important issues 
regarding the location of the crisis and post-crisis in the city. Firstly, it 
reflects a consensus among policy makers that the city-region is the 
privileged scale of action for economic competitiveness and wellbeing. For 
example, this was publically expressed by Anton Costas, Professor at the 
University of Barcelona and Director of the Círculo de Economía (a local 
elites’ think tank) at the Crisis, the Debate of Barcelona talk held in 2011: 
“until now, we believed it was the countries and not the cities that were 
important. Today, that we have good metropolitan statistics, we can see that 
when a country goes well, it is because there’s one or two big cities that pull 
forward”. 
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Secondly, the slogan also asserts that Barcelona is moving into the right 
direction. The Barcelona economic model generates a big consensus 
amongst the economic and cross-party politics and beyond.i This consensus 
has been built by involving a broad base of stakeholders both from the 
public and private sector in setting the city’s economic development policy 
priorities. For example, the strategy for a shift towards a knowledge-based 
economy, and in particular Smart City strategies, has been set at a city-
regional scale not only metropolitan city councils but also the provincial and 
regional governments, as well as business associations, unions and other 
local economic and cultural institutions. And fundamentally, through the 
Metropolitan Strategic Plan of Barcelona (PEMB by its Catalan acronym; 
funded in 1988) and the Industrial Agreement of the Metropolitan Region 
(Pacte industrial, funded in 1997) ii. They are both private non-profit 
institutions led by local and metropolitan authorities that frame and 
coordinate economic strategies.  Thus,all elite actors are represented within 
those institutions, making it less vulnerable to changes in power.  
Indeed, our interviewees recognised that the unprecedented victory of 
aright-wing nationalist city Mayor in 2011 did not imply a change of strategy 
or discourse. This was expressed by a representative of a neighbourhood 
association: “They are not challenging the Barcelona of  the [previous] 
socialist government”(representative of neighbourhood association). If 
anything, the change of mayor represented a deepening of the model with a 
move  towards the inclusion of more private sector actors leading the 
economic development strategyiii. Thus, changes in the political colour of the 
local government up until 2015 have not necessarily changed the diagnostic 
of the crisis and the post-crisis scenarios for the city. The emphasis is 
therefore on the added value cities have to offer to post-recession pathways. 
The new local government in 2011, building on the previous narrative of the 
knowledge-based-economy expanded it to a Smart City strategy (March and 
Ribera-Fumaz 2016). 
To fully understand the narration of the crisis in Barcelona we need to 
locate it within another meta-narrative that has been constructed at the 
regional level in response to the crisis: the case for Catalan independence. 
Based on a similar diagnosis of the collapse of the Spanish state, the 
movement for the independence of Catalonia has grown from representing 
less of 20% of citizens to almost 50% since the start of the crisis (Charnock 
et al 2014). Interestingly this independentism has been easily detached from 
the strategic vision of the city by the local elites, as the Smart City is seen as 
the way forward (March and Ribera-Fumaz 2016). iv  
Finally, we need to also analyse the counter-hegemonic narratives of the 
crisis which in Barcelona have been particularly strong at an international 
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scale and have influenced the most recent change in the local government. 
These narratives have directly questioned the interpretation that the 2008 
crisis originated ‘out there’ and had nothing to do with the ‘Barcelona 
model’. The deep impact of the crisis in terms of deterioration of living 
conditions, evictions, unemployment, etc., erupted in May 15 2011 in cities 
across Spain including Barcelona. The rise of the Indignados movement, 
between 2011 and 2014 was a moment, amongst many other things, of re-
politisation of local society. It was not only a time for protest and resistance 
for grassroots organizational learning and construction of alternatives 
(Martínez 2015). Indeed, this led to a new electoral platform of urban 
activists and left-wing politicians under the name ‘Guanyem Barcelona’ 
(Let’s win Barcelona) which won the May 2015 municipal elections with a 
25% of the vote. As a result, Ada Colau, the former leader of the Spanish 
anti-housing eviction movement, became the new mayor of Barcelona. 
‘Guanyem Barcelona’ was the kick off of several citizens-led platforms that 
won key city councils such as Madrid, Valencia, Santiago de Compostela, 
Zaragoza, Cadiz. The narrative was not anymore the crisis is ‘out there’ but 
it is endogenously created and profited from:  
Taking advantage of the economic crisis, economic powers have 
launched an open offensive against the rights and social conquests of 
the majority of the population … We can’t afford another institutional 
blockade from above that leaves us without a future. We need to 
strengthen, more than ever, the social fabric and spaces for citizens to 
self-organize. But the time has also come to take back the institutions 
and put them at the service of the majority and of the common good 
(Guanyem Barcelona, 2014: online).  
To conclude, in Barcelona the crisis was initially constructed as external to 
the city, as a result of the collapse of the Spanish economy and nation-state. 
In this scenario, Barcelona, with sound fiscal budgets and thriving on 
tourism and the knowledge-based economy, presented itself as a solution to 
the crisis. The crisis thus offered a discursive opportunity to reassert the 
role of Barcelona as a model city and the need for an independent Catalonia 
as a solution to the deficiencies of the Spanish national state. However, 
activist and urban movement counter-hegemonic interpretations that locate 
the crisis within the urban speculative growth model eventually broke 
through arguing that the solution to the crisis is indeed more Barcelona but 
a Barcelona from below, responsive to the needs of city dwellers being 
dispossessed of their social rights and place of living. 
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Brussels: crisis? which one?  
Brussels is the capital city of Belgium and located centrally in Western 
Europe, recognised as a “very important world city” (GaWC, 2012). Its 
regional economy is the third strongest of Europe, with a GDP per capita 
that is more than double of the EU-28 average in 2014 (Eurostat, 2016). As 
the national, regional as well as the de facto EU capital, it houses an 
important and also international public sector and it is strongly dominated 
by service industries. The pre-crisis model of urban economic development 
reflects this economic configuration, driven by the combination of the 
(inter)national public service sector and private service growth. In 2012, 
12% of the added value was created in the public sector, with business 
services, rental and real estate being responsible for 24% and financial 
services for 18%. Despite the thriving urban economy, unemployment is 
remarkably high at more than 17% in 2015, one of the highest figures in 
Europe (Eurostat, 2015).  
This is due to the spatial mismatch between the high education levels 
generally required for a job and the relatively low educational level of many 
inhabitants, often of a migrant background, who have suffered a long term 
unemployment crisis (Kesteloot, 1994). This spatial mismatch is well-known, 
but effective strategies to counter this are hampered by the highly 
fragmented governance system with 19 municipal governments and bi-
communitarian governance arrangements deriving from its status as capital 
of a bilingual national state. Although the socio-economic and demographic 
dynamics in Brussels are strongly shaped by its world city status and 
partially disconnected from the national demographic and socio-economic 
dynamics, in political terms Brussels remains embedded in the Belgian 
national governance framework. As we will see later on, this generates 
structural selectivities that shape how the crisis is narrated in 
Brussels.Although the large public sector acted as a buffer in Brussels, the 
global financial-economic crisis still generated significant impact. In 2008, 
the industrial production index decreased by 15% and unemployment rose 
by 10.8% between September 2008 and 2009, especially amongst young 
people. Comparatively with other western European cities, the impact on the 
Brussels real estate market has been rather limited (Fédération Royale du 
Notariat belge, 2010), due to the large presence of the large public sector.  
Despite this real impact of the crisis, limited ‘discourse’ was produced on 
the crisis in Brusselsv. The crisis generated little debate in the BCR 
parliamentvi. No special policy reports were produced, let alone new policy 
narratives and big strategies launched to counter the crisis, neither by 
policy-makers, nor by civil society organisations. The few policy 
interventions that were developed in explicit response to the global financial-
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economic crisis were limited in scope and/or rather conventional in nature 
(i.e. intensification of pre-existing measures): improving access to credit for 
companies in Brussels (Bruzz, 2009), BCR loans to municipalities to cope 
with the impact of the collapse of the Gemeentelijke Holding on the 
municipal budgets (see below) (DS, 2011) and increased financial support of 
municipalities for the local public welfare centres (Brussel Nieuws, 2011). 
This observation on the lack of ‘crisis discourses’ was confirmed by several 
interviewees: A board member of local public welfare centre recalled that 
“there was no big debate on the crisis”. A Trade Union representative 
remarked that “the crisis does not change employment policy” and “the 
Brussels unemployment problem has nothing to do with the crisis, but the 
crisis amplifies [it]”. And according to a public sector expert of local public 
welfare centres  “we cannot do much but undergo the crisis”, “you need to 
connect economic crisis with [pre-existing, authors] ‘asylum crisis’ and 
homelessness crisis”.  
The global financial-economic crisis was hence not seized upon as a 
discursive opportunity to challenge the existing urban development 
trajectory, but further amplified a long perceived crisis situation. The sense 
of crisis emerging from the global financial-economic crisis was absorbed by 
a set of long lasting structural crises that find their roots in the trajectory of 
Brussels as a ‘dismal’ political world city and that make the global financial-
economic crisis look like a kind of conjunctural occurrence (Oosterlynck, 
2012). In our research, all interviewees – in one way or another – linked the 
global financial-economic crisis to other crises such as the asylum seekers 
crisisvii, the crisis of long-term unemployment and the crisis of the 
municipal budget. Hence, the phrase that most aptly capture how the crisis 
has been narrated in Brussels is ‘the crisis, which crisis?’.  
We will illustrate this with one example namely the threat to municipal 
budgets due to the financial problems of Gemeentelijke Holding. 
Gemeentekrediet (literally ‘Municipal Credit’), was established as a public 
credit company in 1860 owned by Belgian municipalities and acting as its 
banker. From the early 1990s onwards, it pursued an aggressive 
internationalisation strategy, which led to a merger with Crédit Local de 
France in 1996, renaming itself Dexiaviii. The participation in Dexia delivered 
a steady stream of dividends to the municipalities, which many needed to 
keep their budget in balance. In 2000 it acquired Financial Security 
Assurance (FSA) in the US becoming the world’s leading financial service 
provider for the public sector. But this move exposed Dexia badly to the 
collapse of the US real estate market to the point the Belgian governments 
had to intervene to keep the bank afloat. This concomitantly led to liquidity 
problems for Gemeentelijke Holding (GH), which was abolished. The 
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Brussels municipalities thus lost the yearly stream of dividends and part of 
its participation in a loan extended to Dexia in 2008 to keep the bank afloat.  
Although several politicians referred to the roots of the crisis in the 
liberalisation of the banking sector and aggressive international expansion 
of Dexia bank, the political debate on the abolishment of GH quickly 
dissolved in the ongoing and long term concerns about the weak budgetary 
situation of many municipalities in Brussels. The solution for the financial 
impact of the GH abolishment followed the same direction to what had been 
engineered for the ‘structural underfunding’ of the municipalities. The 
proposition was not to raise the ‘additional income tax’, (already the highest 
in Belgium), or land taxes, which would make Brussels less attractive, but 
financial support of BCR to the municipalities and extra means through the 
federal re-financing of Region (BCR Government declaration 2009; Brussels 
Hoofdstedelijk Gewest Integraal verslag, Commissie voor de Financiën, 
zitting 24 Oktober 2011). When asked about the impact of the abolishment 
of GH on municipal budgets, the municipal budget expert of the association 
of the BCR municipalities (VSGB-AVCB) responded with a long-winded and 
detailed historical account in which he presented the ‘budgetary crisis’ not 
as part of a financial globalisation narrative, but as a consequence of a 
historical imbalance in the complex Belgian governance system. He traced it 
back to what he claimed was an unfair and substantial decrease in the 
share of the BCR municipalities in the regionalized Municipality Fund in 
1974 – from 17% before to 9,5% after regionalization (Interview with R. 
Petit). This widely shared sense of a protracted - and hence normalized - 
sense of budgetary crisis is regularly fed by recurring new reports on the 
steady overall impoverishment of the Brussels population. Between 1999 
and 2013 the average income in the Brussels Capital Region rose only by 
18% compared to 31% for the average income in Belgium, which is now 14% 
higher than in Brusselsix. This results in an erosion of the local tax base 
that is 22% lower than the Belgian average (2013) (Observatorium voor 
Gezondheid en Welzijn Brussel, 2016: 15), which is a complete reversal of 
the situation during the post-war decades (VSGB - Verslag over de financiën 
van de Brusselse gemeenten 2002-2011). There hence was already a strong 
and protracted sense of budgetary crisis, which – despite being rooted in its 
global city status – is routinely narrated as an ‘internal’ Belgian issue 
related to a presumably unfair budgetary redistributive mechanisms within 
the Belgian governance system. The local impact of the financial crisis thus 
served mainly to highlight the budgetary vulnerability of the Brussels 
municipalities that resulted from this, rather than acting as a source for the 
rethinking of existing governance rationalities in any new way.  
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Turin: the crisis, here it is again 
Turin, in the north-west of Italy, used to be known as a paradigmatic one-
company town due to the location of  FIAT (its acronym stands for Fiat 
Automobili Italia Torino), one of the main carmakers in Western Europe. 
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s the city suffered a deep 
deindustrialisation process which ended the primacy of the industrial sector 
and led to a shift towards a more service-oriented economy. In the late 
1990s, the nomination of the city to host the 2006 Winter Olympic Games 
radically changed the city’s image, which started being portrayed as a 
‘creative city’, strongly committed to culture-led regeneration (Vanolo, 2015). 
In this context, Turin played a pioneering role in strategic planning in Italy 
(Pinson, 2002), being frequently compared to conventional models of 
entrepreneurial urbanism in Europe, such as Barcelona and Manchester.  
In Turin, the Winter Olympic Games in 2006 were considered a successful 
event, leading to a renewed sense of civic pride and the city being held as a 
role model in both economic and governance terms in Italy (Emmott, 2012). 
However, already in 2010 the city government disclosed a high public debt, 
the highest per capita in Italy. Only one year later, in 2011, Italy’s 
government attracted the attention of the European Central Bank due to its 
high debt-to-GDP ratio, inducing prime minister Silvio Berlusconi to resign. 
Since then, international news media started associating Italy with the so-
called PIGS countries (Portugal, Ireland, Greece, Spain), comprising the 
financially troubled economies in the European Union (Faiola and 
Schneider, 2011). Italy’s model of ‘concerted neoliberalism’ (Rossi, 2012), 
based on the active involvement of the organisations representing workers 
and employers in the enactment of market-oriented reform proposals, thus 
entered a crisis of legitimation. The ensuing local austerity measures 
together with the global economic slump heavily  impacted on the labour 
market: the unemployment rate rose from 5, 6% in 2008 to 12.9 in 2014, 
amongst the highest in the North of Italy. In this context, the manufacturing 
sector, which had constantly shrunk for a decade, lost 15,000 jobs between 
2008 and 2009, then regaining only a few hundred jobs in the following two 
years (Istat, annual reports). The other main sectors have been more 
resilient to the crisis with the public sector retaining its employment share 
and retail slowing down after a massive increase between 2001 and 2008.  
In Turin, this crisis has been perceived as a déjà vu of the crisis experienced 
in the 1980s, when the city got traumatized by the loss of about 130 
thousand jobs in the automotive sector, dissolving its identity as a solid 
company town attracting domestic migrants from all across the country in 
post-war Italy. This sense of repetition has been reinforced by an even 
stronger sense of lost hope: the illusion brought on by the designation in 
1999 as Olympic city symbolising a successful transition to a post-Fordist 
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city investing in cultural and sports events and related urban 
transformation projects. Existing problems of social deprivation were 
dampened in public to conform to the image of a re-invented successful city; 
the city’s economic renaissance was inflated. As an executive of a large bank 
foundation with headquarters in Turin put it to us: “recently the mass 
media got so interested in the economic crisis in Turin because Turin is seen 
as the ‘fallen giant’”. Therefore, the 2008 global financial crisis and the 2010 
budgetary crisis not only affected negatively the lives of residents in Turin 
but also deeply affected their identity as a post-Fordist city.  
The chairman of the local branch of Union Camere (Chamber of commerce) 
told us in an interview that this repetitive sense of the crisis meant that: 
 
“At the beginning we perceived the crisis less because Turin is more 
accustomed to a condition of crisis. Despite diversification efforts, our 
economy is still centred on the manufacturing sector and particularly 
the automotive industry, which has suffered a lot from the crisis, 
while small and medium-sized firms are weaker here compared with 
other areas in our Piedmont region” 
 
The shock originally associated with the disclosure of local government’s 
indebtedness in 2010 overlapped with Italy’s sovereign debt crisis and the 
initiation of an austerity programme imposed by the European Central 
Bank. In this context, the local government started adopting measures 
aimed at debt relief, such as the partial privatisation of public utilities, 
although some of these never materialised. Only at this time, there was the 
perception of the city being hit by a major economic downturn.  
At the policy level, Turin’s politico-economic elites have reacted to the 
economic downturn seeking to revive the city’s entrepreneurial approach to 
urban governance. The third strategic planning process for the city entitled 
‘Torino metropoli 2025’ was presented in 2015. As simply put by the 
coordinator of this plan in an interview for this research “this plan has been 
literally founded on the crisis, as this is a plan without funding”. While 
building on the same economic rationale of the previous two plans, the idea 
of Turin as a knowledge-based economy, this plan has gone almost 
unnoticed by the general public (unlike the previous two), which has 
appeared increasingly disenchanted with the political process. Critical views 
hold that the city’s economy is stuck not only because of the global 
economic crisis, but also because of a self-reproducing, elitist politico-
economic system (the so-called ‘Sistema Torino’ within the wider ‘Sistema 
Italia’) dominated by unaccountable party bureaucracies and interest groups 
(Pagliassotti, 2014). This perception of elitist urban government, and the 
combined effects of the austerity measures, has led to a widespread sense of 
political disillusionment and social resentment. 
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Social contestation peaked in December 2013, when an apparently self-
organised multitude of temporary workers, street vendors, impoverished 
retailers and unemployed young people took to the streets and grounded the 
city to a halt for three days, giving rise to riots in the historic centre. Since 
then, in the national mass media Turin has been increasingly presented as 
an example of the prolonged recession affecting the Italian economy and 
society, especially in relation to the restructuring of its manufacturing and 
retail trade sectors. The political disenfranchisement with the local elites 
and the effects of the crisis led to a turning point in the city’s political 
trajectory in May 2016 when the candidate of the citizen-led, populist, 5-
Star Movement party surprisingly won over the existing mayor supported by 
Italy’s currently ruling party. The electoral political geography show a 
divided city with low income and middle class neighbourhoods voting for 
Five-star, while the more affluent central areas choosing the centre-left 
candidate.   
Local political leaders have expressed an ambivalent attitude towards the 
urban dimension of the recent crisis. On the one hand, they acknowledge its 
strong impact on Turin’s economy in terms of unemployment and social 
exclusion. On the other hand, political leaders refuse the dramatization of 
the crisis in Turin offered by the mass media, particularly in light of the civil 
unrest of December 2013. The former mayor of Turin for example in our 
interview said to us that “Via Amendola [the street in the city centre where 
many shops closed attracting media attention in 2012] is quite a unique 
case and cannot be generalized in the way media have been doing lately. I 
don’t see this journalism as serious” (April 2014). In conclusion, in Turin the 
crisis is seen as an intricate phenomenon, multi-scalar and multi-temporal, 
resulting at one and the same time from the global and supranational 
contexts, but also from internal weaknesses, such as the unfinished 
deindustrialisation process of the Fordist times and the ‘mega-event bubble’ 
associated with the Winter Olympics of 2006. 
 
 
A crisis compared: variegated narrations, same old solutions 
Our comparative analysis has taken us in a journey to locate the 2008 
global financial crisis in four different areas of Europe: North: Leeds; centre: 
Brussels; South: Barcelona and Turin. We looked at how local actors 
interpreted the global financial crisis in terms of its geographical trajectory 
and timing and how the crisis became local – what did it mean for that 
particular city at that particular time and, how the impacts and 
interpretations of the crisis shaped emerging policy responses. This 
comparative analysis allows us to make a wider contribution to study of 
variegated urban neoliberalisation processes. 
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In terms of the timing of the crisis, we find significant differences. In Leeds, 
the crisis was felt strongly very early on with the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers in September 2008 and there was agitation amongst local elites. By 
2011, with the national austerity package, the crisis lost significance at the 
local level as it became a national issue. In Turin, the crisis became ‘local’ 
when the deficit of the municipality was made public in 2010 and 
aggravated by the Italy’s government debt crisis from 2011 and local street 
protests in 2013. In Barcelona, early on, the city proclaimed itself as a 
model for finding local solutions to the global and national crisis, but from 
2011, citizen contestation was making clear that the city was going through 
very difficult moments. In Brussels it is difficult to pinpoint a specific 
moment as the global financial crisis was absorbed by long term and 
ongoing local/regional governance and budgetary crisis. Therefore, 
particularly in the early stages, the crisis did not ‘arrive’ to our cities at the 
same time, it was not felt as one synchronised global event. 
In terms of the geographical trajectory of the crisis, each city also 
interpreted this slightly differently although most local elites agreed that the 
crisis was arriving from elsewhere. In Barcelona, the local elites distanced 
themselves from the origins of the crisis which was attributed to the 
national and international scales. Similarly in Leeds, it was linked to the US 
subprime mortgage market crisis and the banking credit crunch and later 
on to the national government. In Brussels the crisis was associated with 
the complicated national and regional governance arrangements. In Turin 
the global crisis intermeshed with local and national factors: the municipal 
budgetary crisis which was seen as a failure of the post-industrial strategy 
of the 2006 Olympic Games but also as an effect of the country’s wider debt 
crisis.  
Therefore we see that there has been a significant variation in how local 
actors narrated the  global financial crisis in terms of both impact and 
response, particularly in relation to its timings and geographical trajectories. 
Previous experiences of urban crisis also had a strong influence in how each 
city reacted. In Turin, the city had developed an identity based around its 
renaissance after the deep 1970s crisis which made it difficult for the local 
elites to fully accept the latest crisis. In Brussels it was more a case of the 
city having gone through a period of multiple almost chronic crisis at 
various scales (local, regional, national) which made the local decision 
makers miss the 2008 global crisis as a particularly relevant event for them. 
Therefore the previous experience of crisis, constrained and shaped the 
meaning making process to interpret the  the most current crisis would be 
received.  
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Finally, in terms of policy responses, austerity measures are constraining 
even more local authorities in their functions and forcing them to privatise 
or co-deliver services. “Austerity urbanism” (Peck, 2012) is being justified 
and dealt with in slightly different forms:  In Leeds the emphasis is for the 
local authority to become a ‘civic entrepreneur’, a facilitator of private 
investment. In Turin and Barcelona ‘smart city’ has become the new slogan 
which is easily combined with a leaner and more efficient local authority on 
a reduced budget. In the four cities we have seen a strengthening of the city-
regional scale shifting more responsibilities to non-accountable and private-
led governance bodies. Still, it is too early to say whether the new local 
governments in Turin and Barcelona, which have emerged out of 
contestation to the crisis, will throw out something new, although at least 
for the case of Spain the constraints of the previous model and the austerity 
frame are proving a big challenge (Martí-Costa and Subirats, 2016) 
What we have learnt from this comparative analysis is that there is great 
variation in the way in which the global financial crisis was made ‘local’, 
particularly in its timing and geographical trajectory and how local actors 
interpreted the significance of it. This chimes with Jessop’s (2015:100) point 
that “those affected by crisis typically disagree on their objective and 
subjective aspects because they start from different entry points, 
standpoints, and capacities to read the crisis”. There is however less 
variation between the cities in terms of the policy responses and initiatives 
that have emerged from the crisis and we do not see any significant 
rethinking of the previous local economic development strategies. We can 
explain this potential paradox in various ways. Firstly, it seems clear from 
our case study evidence that the crisis has not been seized as an 
opportunity to question the pre-crisis model of urban economic 
development. Local actors did not think this was a crisis of or in their own 
growth models; none of the local politico-economic elites seem to have made 
a connection publically between the real-estate, financialised and mega-
event fuelled urban growth of the early 2000s particularly in Turin, 
Barcelona and Leeds with the sub-prime mortgage and financial crisis of the 
2007-8. It was the social movements from the 2011 that emerged globally 
and that had special prominence in Barcelona that made this direct 
connection. Therefore we do not find that the crisis has significantly altered 
the neoliberal rationalities that informed pre-crisis urban governance. 
Secondly, this local experiences are resonating with the chatter at the 
national and international policy creation and circulation circles, where the 
same best practices and policy recipes that had become prominent in the 
last decades are still valid although with less budget (Oosterlynck and 
Gonzalez, 2013). Thus narratives such as the Smart or the Resilient City or 
the Civic Entrepreneur, which we have seen in our case studies, are 
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particularly appropriate because they combine a sense of something new 
but with less public resources attached. 
In the beginning of this contribution we argued that a Cultural Political 
Economy approach suggests that crisis can be opening moments for 
contestation and questioning of established imaginaries and thus critical 
moments for the study of variegation. In Turin and Barcelona we have seen 
forms of public contestation and questioning, leading to some 
“(re)politisation of sedimented discourses and practices” as put it by Jessop 
(2015). In Turin, the post-Fordist renaissance was put in question and in 
Barcelona the ‘Barcelona Model’ was openly criticised. However this 
(re)politicisation has not been enough to change established governmental 
rationalities. Fuller and West (2016), in their study of the lack of 
contestation of the austerity discourse in the UK, explain that critique does 
not necessarily emerge from crisis. “Crisis talk” by powerful actors, they 
argue, might not give rise to a new social order because they manage the 
situation to supress contestation and maintain the social order. “Crisis talk” 
can in fact serve to displace contestation and the more socially justice 
alternatives to the “current neoliberal order” because citizens are presented 
with the alternative of a much worse situation if public spending cuts are 
not made.  Local actors allude to a “macro-economic inevitability” (Fuller 
and West, 2016: 9) to justify their actions, something we have seen at work 
in our case studies. This resonates with Jessop’s argument of the role of 
dominant social forces trying to stabilize capital’s contradictions and crisis 
by prioritising some contradictions more than others (Jessop, 2014). In our 
case studies we show the role of the local actors in channelling and 
translating the significance of the global financial crisis as something 
external, not threatening the foundations of the local economic development 
trajectories and therefore themselves. Therefore, crisis moments can create 
openings for contestation and questioning but this does not necessarily lead 
to radical changes as long as the same or similar configuration of powerful 
actors remain in place. However, despite this lack of radical changes, we 
have shown the importance of the local scale as an important arena for the 
study of variegation thus contributing to ongoing discussions about the 
need to spatialise further the uneven development of capitalism (Peck and 
Theodore, 2007) 
 
Conclusions 
Crisis moments are a particular  fertile territory for the analysis of 
variegation and the ways in which processes of neoliberalism might be 
deepened, contested, re-oriented or transformed. In this paper we aimed to 
explore both how variegation is produced and the potential windows for 
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alternative futures paying special attention to governmental rationalities . 
We have done so by questioning the conventional deterritorialized lens at 
which we are accustomed to look at the global crisis. In contrast, we have 
held a twofold perspective: a focus on the local scale – within broader and 
complex urban geographies – and a comparative analysis. This double view 
has allowed us to learn about wide processes (such as the global financial 
crisis) from looking comparatively in depth at various cities confirming 
Robinson’s point that “experiences in different places could shape and 
transform conceptualisations of these wider processes” (2016:13). 
In a nutshell we have found that the global financial crisis from the 2007/8 
initially impacted our four cities in very different ways. One important 
finding from our research is that the global financial crisis unfolded not as 
one single event, like an explosion radiating outwards in a unidirectional 
trajectory but as series of events, sometimes loosely connected, with a 
geographically diverse topography. It was experienced very differently 
according to the place where you look at it from, from its timing and phases, 
to its impact. The global financial crisis did not always dominate the 
economic imaginaries of local actors but it temporarily acquired prominence 
when it resonated with locally relevant events. As this crisis turned into 
austerity measures the experience has become more homogeneous. Thus we 
are faced with the deepening of uneven development of capitalism in Europe, 
and therefore, of its crisis impacts on the one hand; and, the increasing 
similar ‘local’ responses framed in structural trends of austerity at national 
and European scale and few urban discourses increasingly produced 
globally (e.g. Smart Cities), on the other. Ironically, these solutions or policy 
ideas that emerged out from the crisis are not very different to pre-crisis 
times and also do not differ substantially between cities. The global financial 
crisis has not led to a questioning of the pre-crisis entrepreneurial forms of 
urban governance; most cities saw the crisis as an external and global 
process. In fact austerity measures are furthering market-led mechanisms 
within local authorities although we still need to see how ‘citizen-led’ 
governments in Turin and Barcelona will behave. There was therefore a 
variegation in how the crisis was ‘made local’, in how its significance was 
interpreted and its impact on local economic imaginaries across our four 
cities. We find however a lot less variegation in how new imaginaries out of 
the crisis were constructed; there seems to be a re-adaptation and 
retrofitting of pre-crisis policy recipes.  
Through our comparative analysis of the variegated urbanisation of the 
global financial crisis we have been able to investigate how existing 
governmental rationalities have navigated through the global economic crisis 
and its prolonged aftermath in different national and geo-economic contexts. 
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We have seen the importance of powerful local actors in interpreting and 
narrating the place of their cities in the world. We have emphasised the role 
of the economic imaginaries that have been built in each city through a 
historical trajectory which shapes and conditions the range of options 
available to local actors to interpret the crisis. This is an important 
contribution to the influential work on variegated neoliberalisation processes 
by Brenner et al (2009) which has tended to overlook the role of specific 
actors and established governmental rationalities at the local scale and pays 
less attention to the processes of meaning-making that particular agents 
engage into. Instead, our Cultural Political Economy approach combined 
with a comparative perspective, has shown the important role of local agents 
in the variegation process. We have also show the importance of 
contextualising local arenas within national path dependent trajectories as 
well as supra-national (such as European Union policies and regulatory 
frameworks) and the resilience of neoliberal reason at the global level. In 
doing so, our comparative analysis of the discursive framing of the crisis has 
showed how mainstream politico-economic elites dealing with global 
economic crisis have tended to justify the reproduction of pre-crisis politico-
economic patterns: Leeds’ mobilization of the notion of resilience as a way to 
protract its economic development model; Brussels’ refuse to acknowledge 
the relevance itself of the economic crisis; Barcelona’s laying the blame on 
the national state for being responsible of the crisis; Turin’s perception of 
the crisis as a déjà vu denying the very possibility of a radical change. These 
can be all interpreted as discursive tactics emanating from the ‘political 
unconscious’ (Jameson, 1981) of urban neoliberalism, more or less 
deliberately aimed at reasserting the power of hegemonic blocs and 
coalitions as well as of socially accepted styles of government and modes of 
administering the economy. However, despite these efforts by powerful 
actors to seek stability new contradictions are constantly emerging: the 
deepening of the crisis of European political and financial project, likely to 
affect citizens in all our case study cities; but also new waves of social 
resentment undermining the legitimacy of existing elites and giving rise to 
different forms of political turmoil, at both national and local levels, as 
recent municipal elections in Barcelona and Turin as well as the ‘Brexit’ vote 
in the United Kingdom have showed. All of these conflicts offer illustrative 
evidence of the highly contradictory character of the present post-recession 
transition and the central role cities are playing in it.  
 
 
 
24 
 
Acknowledgements 
This paper draws from research conducted with the financial support of the 
Leverhulme Trust (grant number F10/1010 A). We are grateful to the 
support provided throughout the project by Prof Martin Jones who acted as 
our senior mentor. We also acknowledge the fantastic logistical support by 
Calum Carson from the University of Leeds.   
 
References 
Aalbers, M. (Ed) (2012) Subprime Cities. The political economy of mortgage 
markets. Wiley Blackwell, Oxford. 
Advice Leeds (2014) Social Security? The impact of welfare reform in Leeds. 
Advice Leeds, Leeds. (Available at: 
http://adviceservicestransition.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2014/07/Advice-Leeds-The-Impact-of-Welfare-Reform-in-
Leeds.pdf)  
Barcelona City Council (2016). 2015 Tourist statistics. Barcelona: city and 
surroundings. Barcelona City Council, Barcelona.  
Blyth, M. (2013) Austerity: the history of a dangerous idea. Oxford University 
Press, Oxford. 
Brenner, N., Peck, J. and Theodore, N. (2010) Variegated neoliberalization: 
geographies, modalities, pathways. Global networks 10(2) 182-222.  
Brusselnieuws (2011) Brusselse OCMW’s geven meer uit door crisis, Brussel 
Nieuws, 26 Januari 2011. 
Brussels Hoofdstedelijk Gewest Integraal verslag (2011), Commissie voor de 
Financiën, zitting 24 Oktober 2011 
Bruzz (2009) ‘Regering verlengt anticrisismaatregelen’ (available at 
http://www.bruzz.be/nl/nieuws/regering-verlengt-anticrisismaatregelen) 
Byrne, M. (2016) Entrepreneurial Urbanism After the Crisis: Ireland’s Bad 
Bank” and the Redevelopment of Dublin’s Docklands, Antipode doi: 
10.1111/anti.12231 
25 
 
Charnock, G, Purcell, T and Ribera-Fumaz, R. (2014) The Limits to Capital: 
Crisis and Revolt in the European South. Palgrave-Macmillan, Basinkstoke 
Costas, A (2011). “La Economía". Conference held on the Crisis, the Debate 
of Barcelona, Centre de Cultura de Barcelona, 14 March 2011. 
Donald, B., Glasmeier, A., Gray, M. and Lobao, L. (2014) Austerity in the 
city: economic crisis and urban service decline?  Cambridge Journal of 
Regions, Economy and Society 7, 3–15 
DS (2011) Brussel vangt verliezen op, 25 November 2011, p.39. 
Duménil, G. and Lévy, D. (2011) The crisis of neoliberalism. Harvard 
University Press, London.  
Emmott, B. (2012) Good Italy, Bad Italy: Why Italy Must Conquer Its Demons 
to Face the Future. Yale University Press, London. 
Enright, T. (2014) The great wager: crisis and mega-project reform in 21st-
century Paris, Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society 7(1) 155-
170  
EU Commission (2014) Sixth report on economic, social and territorial 
cohesion, DG Regional and Urban Policy, Brussels (Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docoffic/official/reports/cohe
sion6/6cr_en.pdf) 
EU Commission (2011) Cities of tomorrow. DG Regional Policy, Brussels 
(Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/studies/pdf/citiesof
tomorrow/citiesoftomorrow_final.pdf ) 
Eurostat (2015)  Chômage dans les régions de l’Union européenne en 2015, 
Eurostat.  
(Available at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/File:Ch%C3%B4mage_dans_les_r%C3%A9gions_de_l%
E2%80%99Union_europ%C3%A9enne_en_2015_1.png) 
Eurostat (2016) 2014 GDP per capita in 276 EU regions 39/2016 - 26 
February 2016, (Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/7192292/1-26022016-
AP-EN.pdf/602b34e8-abba-439e-b555-4c3cb1dbbe6e) 
Faiola, A. and Schneider, H. (2011) Debt crisis threatens Italy, one of euro 
zone’s biggest economies. The Washington Post, 12 July. 
26 
 
Fédération Royale du Notariat belge (2010). L’évolution des prix de 
l’immobilier bruxellois en 2009. Bruxelles, Fédération Royale du Notariat 
belge. 
Fuller, C. and West, K. (2016) The possibilities and limits of political 
contestation in times of ‘urban austerity’. Urban Studies  
doi:10.1177/0042098016651568 
GaWc (2012). The World According to GaWC 2012. (Available at 
http://www.lboro.ac.uk/gawc/world2012t.html) (last accessed 4 August 
2016) 
González, S. and Hodkinson, S., (2014) Gentrificación como política pública 
en una ciudad provincial: El caso de la ciudad de Leeds en el Reino Unido. 
Revista de geografía Norte Grande, 58 93-109.  
González, S. (2006) Scalar narratives in Bilbao: a cultural politics of scales 
approach to the study of urban policy. International Journal of Urban and 
Regional Research, 30 4 836-857. 
Gonzalez, S. and Oosterlynck, S. (2014). Crisis and resilience in a finance-
led city: Effects of the global financial crisis in Leeds. Urban Studies.  51 
(15) 3164-3179 
Guanyem Barcelona (2014). Manifest. (available at 
https://guanyembarcelona.cat/signa/) (last accessed 4 August 2016) 
Halliday, J. (2016) Leeds council leader warns that 2,000 jobs are at risk, 
The Guardian, 20th July, 2016: 
https://www.theguardian.com/society/2016/jul/20/leeds-council-may-be-
forced-to-axe-2000-jobs-to-balance-books-leader 
Harvey, D. (2012) Foreword: The urban roots of the financial crisis. In M. 
Aalbers ed. (2012) Subprime Cities. The political economy of mortgage 
markets. Wiley Blackwell, Oxford, pp. xiii-xix. 
Hay, C. (2013) The British Growth Crisis: a crisis of and for growth.  SPERI 
Paper n.1, Sheffield Political Economy Research Institute 
Hereu, J (2009) “Contra la crisis, més Barcelona”. Conference at the 
Barcelona’s Journalist Guild, January 2009. 
Holgersen, S. (2015) Crisis and the Post-Industrial City: Or is Malmö 
Building Yesterday's City Tomorrow, Again?  Tijdschrift voor Economische en 
Sociale Geografie 106 (3) 231–245. 
27 
 
Istat, Annual reports 2001-2014. Url: www.dati.istat.it 
Jameson, F. (1981) The political unconscious: Narrative as a socially symbolic 
act. Cornell University Press, Ithaca. 
Jessop, B. (2014) Capitalist diversity and variety: Variegation, the world 
market, compossibility and ecological dominance, Capital & Class, 38(1) 45–
58 
Jessop, B. (2015) Crisis construal in the North Atlantic Financial Crisis and 
the Eurozone crisis, Competition & Change, 19(2) 95–112 
Jessop, B. and Sum, N.L., 2010. Cultural political economy: Logics of 
discovery, epistemic fallacies, the complexity of emergence, and the potential 
of the cultural turn, New Political Economy, 15(3) 445-451.  
Jessop, B., and Oosterlynck, S., (2008). Cultural Political Economy: on 
Making the Cultural Turn without Falling into Soft Economic Sociology. 
Geoforum, 39(3), 1155-1170.  
Kesteloot, C. (1994) Three levels of socio-spatial polarisation in Brussels, 
Built Environment 20(3) 204-217. 
Larkin, K. and Cooper, M. (2009) Into Recession: Vulnerability and Resilience 
in Leeds, Brighton and Bristol. Centre for Cities, London 
Leeds City Council (2008) Proposed Lloyds TSB Takeover of Halifax Bank of 
Scotland, Report of the Director of City Development Executive Board, 
9/10/2008. (Available at 
http://democracy.leeds.gov.uk/documents/s22853/Lloyds%20TSB%20Tak
eover%20cover%20report%2029%20sept.pdf) 
Leeds City Council (2013) Leeds City Council considers initial budget 
proposals, Press Release, 10/12/2013. (Available at 
http://www.leeds.gov.uk/news/Pages/Leeds-City-Council-considers-initial-
budget-proposals.aspx) 
Leeds City Council (2105) Leeds Economy briefing paper: Index of deprivation 
2015 (Available at 
http://www.leeds.gov.uk/docs/BN62%20Index%20of%20Deprivation%2020
15.pdf) 
Leeds City Council (2106) Leeds Economy Handbook. (Available at 
http://www.leeds.gov.uk/docs/The%20Leeds%20Economy.pdf) 
Lee N., Morris K., and Jones, A. (2009) Recession and recovery: How UK 
Cities can respond and drive the recovery. The Work Foundation, London. 
(available at 
28 
 
www.theworkfoundation.com/assets/docs/publications/220_UK%20Recessi
on_Recovery_CitiesThe%20Work%20Foundation.pdf) 
March, H. and Ribera-Fumaz, R. (2016) Smart contradictions: The politics of 
making Barcelona a self-sufficient city. European Urban and Regional 
Studies, 23(4)816-830.Mayer, M. (2013) First world urban activism. City, 
17(1) 5-19 
Martí-Costa, M. and Subirats J. (2016) Presentación: Crisis, Gobiernos 
Locales y Políticas Urbanas, Ciudad y Territorio. Estudios Territoriales 188 
181-186. 
Martínez, G. (2015). ¿Qué ha pasado en cinco años?. Ctxt, 65, especial 
#Cincoañosdel15M,  (Available at 
http://ctxt.es/es/20160511/Politica/6021/15M-Guillem-Martinez-
presentacion-especial.htm) (last accessed 4 August 2016) 
McFarlane, C., 2010. The comparative city: knowledge, learning, urbanism. 
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 34(4) 725-742. 
Meegan, R., Kennett, P.,  Jones, G., Croft, J. (2014) Global economic crisis, 
austerity and neoliberal urban governance in England, Cambridge Journal of 
Regions, Economy and Society, 2014, 7(1) 137-153 
Metcal, J. (2014) ‘Grim’ decisions to be taken at Leeds City Council with 
latest wave of government funding cuts. Wetherby News, 9th December. 
(Available at: http://www.wetherbynews.co.uk/news/business/grim-
decisions-to-be-taken-at-leeds-city-council-with-latest-wave-of-government-
funding-cuts-1-6995036 ) 
Observatorium voor Gezondheid en Welzijn van Brussel-Hoofdstad (2016) 
Brussels Armoederapport 2016. Brussel: Gemeenschappelijke 
Gemeenschapscommissie  
Oosterlynck, S. (2012). From national capital to dismal political world city: 
the politics of scalar disarticulation in Brussels. In B. Derudder, M. Hoyler, 
P. J. Taylor and F. Witlox eds. (2012) International Handbook of Globalization 
and World Cities. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, pp. 487-496. 
Oosterlynck, S. and E. Swyngedouw (2013). Brussels: a case of spatially 
disarticulated socio-economic development. In F. Martinelli, F. Moulaert and 
A. Novy eds (2013) Urban and regional trajectories in contemporary 
capitalism. Routledge, London, pp. 85-105. 
Pagliasotti, M.  (2014) Sistema Torino Sistema Italia. Rome: Li Edizioni 
29 
 
Parkinson, M. (2012) Second Tier Cities in Europe. ESPON & European 
Institute of Urban Affairs, Liverpool. 
http://people.uta.fi/~atmaso/verkkokirjasto/Second_tier_cities_policy.pdf  
Peck, J. (2012) Austerity urbanism: American cities under extreme 
economy. City, 16(6) 626-655. 
Peck, J. and Theodore, N., 2007. Variegated capitalism. Progress in human 
geography, 31(6), pp.731-772. 
Pinson, G. (2002) Political government and governance: strategic planning 
and the reshaping of political capacity in Turin. International Journal of 
Urban and Regional Research 26(3) 477-493. 
Ribera-Fumaz, R. (2009) From urban political economy to cultural political 
economy: rethinking culture and economy in and beyond the 
urban. Progress in Human Geography 33(4) 447-465.  
Robinson, J. (2014) New Geographies of Theorising the Urban: Putting 
Comparison to Work for Global Urban Studies, in S. Parnell and S. Oldfield 
eds (2014) Handbook for Cities of the Global South. Sage, London 
Robinson, J. (2016) Thinking cities through elsewhere Comparative tactics 
for a more global urban studies. Progress in Human Geography, 40(1) 3-29. 
Rossi, U. (2012) There’s no hope : The global economic crisis and the politics 
of resistance in Southern Europe. Belgeo. Belgian Journal of Geography 1-2 
1-18 
Rossi, U. (2013) On the varying ontologies of capitalism: Embeddedness, 
dispossession, subsumption. Progress in Human Geography, 37(3) 348-365. 
Rossi, U. (2016) The variegated economics and the potential politics of the 
smart city. Territory, Politics, Governance 4 (3) 1-17. 
Schäfer, A. and Streeck, W. (Eds.). (2013) Politics in the Age of Austerity. 
Polity Press, Cambridge 
Schmuecker, K. and Viitanen, J. (2011) Richer yet poorer. Economic 
inequality and polarisation in the North of England, IPPR North 
Springer, S. (2015) Postneoliberalism Review of Radical Political Economics. 
47(1) 5 –17 
Springer, S. (2012) Neoliberalism as discourse: between Foucauldian 
political economy and Marxian poststructuralism. Critical Discourse 
Studies 9(2) 133-147. 
30 
 
Vanolo, A. (2015) The image of the creative city, eight years later: Turin, 
urban branding and the economic crisis taboo, Cities, 46 1-7 
Ward, K., (2008) Editorial—toward a comparative (re) turn in urban studies? 
Some reflections. Urban Geography, 29(5) 405-410. 
Ward, K., (2010) Towards a relational comparative approach to the study of 
cities. Progress in human geography, 34(4) 471-487. 
Yorkshire Forward (2008) Lloyds/TSB HBOS. The Yorkshire Solution, 
October 2008. Leeds: Yorkshire Forward.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
31 
 
 
 
                                                             
i
 In fact, the OECD Local Economic and Employment Development (LEED) met in 
Barcelona in March 2009. The gathering of local economic leaders from across the world 
proclaimed Barcelona as a post-crisis model; indeed the gathering agreed on the so-called 
“Barcelona Principles”, as solutions to the crisis in cities (Oosterlynck and Gonzalez, 2013). 
ii
 PEMB was founded by Barcelona City Council and Metropolitan Authority, Airport, Port 
Free Trade Zone and Fair Authorities, chamber of commerce, Fomento (Business 
Association, two unions and Círculo de Economia (elite’s association). In its Council Board 
there are represented 300 persons and institutions from Universities, business associations to 
cultural ones or the Archbishop of Barcelona. Pacte industrial gathers together 51 city 
councils, regional, provincial and metropolitan authorities, eleven business associations, two 
unions and 22 economic and cultural institutions. 
iii
 Though with different normative emphasis, this was confirmed by interviews with the Head 
of Mayor’s Cabinet, the president of the Federation of Neigbohood Associations and Abel 
Albet academic at Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (see also March and Ribera-Fumaz, 
2016). 
iv
 Indeed, During the nationalist rigth-wing mayor period (2011-2015), besides the support of the local 
council to the pro-independence regional government, there was only one document staging the role of 
Barcelona within an independent Catalonia (Ajuntament de Barcelona 2014). The book, a rather odd 
compilation of short texts by prominent Barcelona figures was prepared in a short period of time (three 
months) and right after the presentation in November 2014 it disappear from public debates about the 
city. 
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v
 This is confirmed by a quick-scan of the main Dutch newspaper (weekly published) for 
Brussels, where the search term ‘economische crisis’ only delivers fourteen relevant articles 
between 2007 and 2015 (see: www.bruzz.be). 
vi
 A search in the electronic database with reports of the debates in the BCR parliament 
between 2008 and 2012 using the term ‘crisis’ only led to the identification of nine sessions 
where one or more questions on the impact of the financial-economic crisis on Brussels were 
asked. See: http://www.weblex.irisnet.be/bhr/ questframe.asp.  
vii
 This asylum seekers crisis refers to the upsurge in requests for support in the public welfare 
centre of the municipality of Brussels, due to the failure of the responsible federal agency 
Fedasil to provide shelter for new refugees.  
viii
 In 2008, Gemeentelijke Holding held 17% of the shares in Dexia (Brussels Hoofdstedelijk 
Gewest Integraal verslag, Commissie voor de Financiën, zitting 24 Oktober 2011. 
ix
 Calculated on the basis of the data provided by Observatorium voor Gezondheid en Welzijn 
Brussel-Hoofdstad, see  
www.observatbru.be/documents/indicateurs/pauvrete/04_nl_gemiddeld-en-mediaan-netto-
belastbaar-inkomen-in-per-jaar-brussels-gewest-en-
gemeenten.xls+&cd=10&hl=fr&ct=clnk&gl=be [last accessed on 19/12/2016] 
